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1. Introduction 
Bernard Williams, in his essay, "Morality: The Peculiar Institution" notes that for 
modem ethical theory, moral obligation is the essence of morality. Moral obligation is a 
"peculiar" kind of obligation. While we recognize all sorts of obligations in human life, 
moral obligation is an unconditional obligation that "goes all the way down."
1 On the 
modem picture of morality, only obligation can trump another obligation. But why is it 
that obligation is taken to be central to morality? Why is it that morality must be 
ultimately grounded in moral obligation? Obligation is the essence of morality because 
the content of morality is generally taken to be categorical imperatives. Categorical 
imperatives are distinguished from hypothetical imperatives in that categorical 
imperatives need no justifying condition for them to be binding on an agent. They 
universally bind an agent just in virtue of being categorical imperatives. The sense of a 
uniquely moral obligation comes from this feature of categorical imperatives. 
Philippa Foot, in her 1972 Essay, "Morality As a System of Hypothetical 
Imperatives" challenges the thesis that morality is a system of categorical imperatives, 
and by extension, then, that obligation is central to morality.2 On her account, morality is 
a system of hypothetical imperatives, similar to the imperatives of etiquette or of club 
rules. The necessity or universality that we associate with moral imperatives, the feeling 
of moral obligation, is simply a consequence of the way morality is taught and of the 
stringency with which moral imperatives are enforced. Obligation, then, is not the 
1 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits Of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), 188. 
2 Philippa Foot, "Morality As a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," 
Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (Jul. 1972), 305-316. 
essence of morality. Moral obligation is an accidental consequence of the way morality 
is taught and enforced. A major criticism of her thesis is her conclusion about the 
accidental nature of obligation. Even philosophers friendly to the overall direction of her 
project argue that there is still more to the notion of obligation than Foot recognizes. 3 
In this thesis, I want to explore what D.Z Phillips calls Foot's "fugitive thought,"4 
the claim that obligation is merely an accident of the way morality is taught and enforced. 
I will argue that Foot is right to challenge the claim that morality is a system of 
categorical imperatives. Furthermore, she may be right to claim that the extent to which 
we experience the feeling of force of moral obligation is at least partly a result of the 
sociological conditions under which morality is taught and enforced. However, her 
analysis of the nature of obligation is incomplete. I will use the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas to offer a somewhat different picture of the nature and place of obligation in the 
moral life. My conclusion will be first that moral imperatives present themselves to us as 
necessary and universal, obligatory, because of the natural fact that humans always, in 
virtue of acting intentionally, pursue the good. Second, I will argue that obligation itself 
arises from a failure of the agent to act from the theological virtue of charity. On my 
analysis, obligation is indeed not the essence of morality. However, this is not because 
obligation is merely an accident of the way morality is taught and enforced. It is rather 
3 See, for instance, Winston Nesbitt, "Categorical Imperatives--A Defense," The 
Philosophical Review 86, no. 2 (Apr. 1977), 217-225; Lawrence C. Becker, "The Finality 
of Moral Judgments: A Reply to Mrs. Foot," The Philosophical Review 82, no. 3 (Jul. 
1973), 364-370; D. Z. Phillips, "In Search of the Moral 'Must': Mrs. Foot's Fugitive 
Thought," Philosophical Quarterly 27, no. 107 (Apr. 1977), 140-157. 
4 Phillips, 140. 
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because obligation ends when the virtues are present; or, perhaps better, obligation does 
not begin unless there is a failure in virtue. 
To accomplish this task, I will first outline Foot's challenge to the claim that 
morality consists of categorical imperatives. I will then briefly outline the structure of 
Aquinas's moral theory. After describing the eudaimonistic and teleological thrust of his 
moral theory and how that accounts for the feeling of necessity and universality, I will 
discuss the relationship between virtue and law in Aquinas. This will be important since 
it will setup the context in which moral imperatives arise. Finally, I will outline John 
Hem's claim that obligation is a failure in love, and show how this claim needs to be 
altered in light of Aquinas's account. 
2. Foot's Thesis 
The modem distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives comes 
from Kant. For Kant, the difference between these two kinds of imperatives is the signal 
feature of what distinguishes morality from anything else. Hypothetical imperatives are 
imperatives which hold only in relation to some given desire or goal. The force of the 
imperative is lost if the relation does not hold. Hypothetical imperatives are, in Kant's 
terms, "good to some purpose."5 Hypothetical imperatives are conditional since they 
only hold if the antecedent obtains. Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, need no 
justifying end precisely because they are ends in themselves. Categorical imperatives are 
not conditioned upon anything; they need no justifying goal or desire to obtain. The 
imperative do not murder is not an imperative that only has 'force' if in fact one has a 
5 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. L. W. Beck, 
quoted in Foot, 306. 
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relevant desire. The imperative cannot properly be put into a conditional form: "if (you 
do not want to get hanged), then do not murder." Certainly, the fear of punishment may 
be a reason that one does not murder, but the imperative itself does not rely on any such 
condition for its applicability. It is a binding imperative on all regardless of one's desires 
or purposes. On Kant's account, moral imperatives, as categorical imperatives, are of a 
different kind than hypothetical imperatives precisely because they need no justifying 
reason. It is this distinction between categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives 
that on the modem view distinguishes morality from anything else. 
But morality as a system composed of categorical imperatives goes further than 
claiming merely that any one imperative needs no justifying reason. Morality as a system 
needs no further justification beyond itself. The reason one ought to follow the 
imperative do not murder is not because some conditional has been met, i.e., the person 
has the relevant desire or goal. The reason one ought to obey the imperative do not 
murder is because it is a moral imperative. But of course, one may well ask, "what 
reason do I have to follow any moral imperative?" On Kant's account, the answer to this 
cannot be "because you care about moral considerations." If this were the case, then any 
moral imperative would be conditional-it ought only to be followed if one in fact cares 
about moral considerations. The justification for morality as a system is not that one in 
fact takes moral considerations seriously; for this would be a hypothetical system. The 
justification is something internal to the moral system itself. For Kant, the form of the 
moral imperative was central. Though few continue to follow Kant in arguing that the 
very form of moral imperatives is what makes moral imperatives universally binding, 
morality nonetheless is generally cashed out as a system that does not consist of 
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conditionals.6 It does not rely on any desire or project external to the system of 
imperatives itself. When we say that one ought to be moral, then, following the legacy of 
Kant, for it to be truly moral we've thought that we must mean it in the strictly categorical 
sense-that is, the system as a whole needs no further justification. 
Perhaps because of the special kind of system we traditionally have taken 
morality to be, moral imperatives have a different 'force' than hypothetical imperatives. 
The force or bindingness of hypothetical imperatives depends wholly upon the 
connection between the imperative and the desired end or goal. If the connection fails , 
then the binding of the imperative gives way. But for moral imperatives, the force is 
much different. It is generally taken to be something special-necessary and 
inescapable.7 Moral imperatives have a special "dignity and necessity" which 
hypothetical imperatives lack.8 By dignity and necessity we mean that the bindingness of 
moral imperatives does not arise from the connection moral imperatives have to any of 
our desires or ends. Rather, the bindingness arises from the imperative itself-it is an 
imperative which presents itself as holding an action "as of itself objectively necessary, 
without any regard to any other end. "9 So, what distinguishes morality from anything 
else is that morality is a system of categorical imperatives. It is this assumption that Foot 
criticizes. 
6 Foot, 305. 
7 Ibid., 308; 311-312; 315. 
8 Ibid., 308. 
9 Kant, quoted in Foot, 306. 
5 
Foot recognizes that we use "should" in different ways. Sometimes when we give 
an imperative, we mean for the bindingness of the imperative to depend wholly upon its 
connection with a particular end-a hypothetical imperative. Other times, when we use 
'should' we intend the imperative to hold without any connection to an end or a goal- a 
categorical imperative. But, Foot asks, is this the only option for this second use of 
'should,' that it is categorical? Foot thinks not and her reasons why are the substance of 
her essay. 
Contemporary ethical theory inherited from Kant an important assumption: not 
only is morality composed of categorical imperatives, as we've noted already, but also 
hypothetical and categorical imperatives are the only kinds of imperatives. 
Consequently, if an imperative is not hypothetical, then, given the assumption, it must be 
categorical. With this assumption in mind, Foot asks us to consider some imperatives 
that she thinks are clearly non-hypothetical. First, she says we find this non-hypothetical 
use of 'should' with respect to rules of etiquette. 10 It is a general given that one should 
follow the rules of etiquette regardless of one's desires. For example, whatever ones 
desires and goals, it is a rule of etiquette not to place one's elbows on the table while 
eating. The rule does not fail to apply to a person even though the person thinks it a silly 
rule. We likewise find this non-hypothetical use of 'should' with respect to club rules. 11 
Club rules apply to all regardless of one's desires. The club rules at Augusta National 
that no woman will be allowed as a member applies to all, whether or not one agrees with 
the rule. Now, if rules of etiquette and club rules are not hypothetical imperatives, and if 
1° Foot, 308. 
11 Ibid. 
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one accepts Kant's distinction that there are only hypothetical imperatives and categorical 
imperatives, then it follows that rules of etiquette and club rules are categorical 
imperatives, and thus moral imperatives. But of course this is plainly wrong. 12 
Clearly rules of etiquette and club rules are not categorical imperatives. But are 
they really non-hypothetical imperatives as well? While it might be the case that any one 
rule of etiquette admits of no exception, couldn't one reasonably ask, "but what reasons 
do I have for following any rule of etiquette in the first place?" Here, the objection 
centers on the important feature we identified above about the moral system as a whole. 
If one were to ask, "but why should I care about following the rules of morality?" the 
answer cannot be "because the rules of morality are means to one of your ends or 
purposes," or "because you do in fact care about moral considerations." This cannot be 
the answer because the justification for the system of morality cannot be anything 
external to the system itself since the system is constituted by categorical imperatives 
which are ends in themselves. But in the case of rules of etiquette or club rules, even 
though any one rule might be non-hypothetical, it looks like the system as a whole is 
hypothetical since we surely wouldn't want to say that the justification for the system of 
etiquette as a whole is something internal to itself. Furthermore, if good reasons for 
caring about the rules of etiquette cannot be given, then rules of etiquette lose their force 
even though any one rule of etiquette is non-hypothetical. So, the rules of etiquette 
depend for their force on a goal or desire, for instance, caring about the rules of etiquette. 
Rules of etiquette don't have any "automatic reason-giving force" like moral rules do. 
12 Ibid., 309. 
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And again, this seems to be the important difference between morality and anything 
else. 13 
Foot grants that this is indeed generally taken to be the important difference 
between the system of morality and a system of hypothetical imperatives. Her 
contention, however, is that this feature is simply asserted without being defended-and 
furthermore, on her account, there is no good defense of the assertion. Foot's point is that 
there is no reason to think that the normative character of moral judgments necessarily 
gives any reason-giving force anymore than rules of etiquette do. 14 Rules of etiquette are 
normative too, but lack the necessity of moral commands precisely because we can 
always ask, "but why should I care about the system of rules of etiquette anyway?" The 
special force of moral imperatives, or the necessity we generally associate with it comes 
from the fact that the answer to that question with respect to morality cannot be anything 
outside of the moral system itself. But again, on Foot's view, this claim is simply asserted 
without being adequately defended. Why are moral imperatives not like the non-
hypothetical rules of etiquette in that, while any one moral imperative may be non-
hypothetical, we can always ask what reasons we have for following moral imperatives in 
the first place? 
But plainly we do associate this special bindingness with morality. From where 
does this binding force come? Foot's answer is that moral rules have just been more 
stringently and consistently enforced than rules of etiquette. 15 Thus, they "feel" more 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 310. 
8 
forceful, or necessary than rules of etiquette or club rules. But there in fact is no good 
reason to think that they possess any real necessity. That is just the feeling that comes 
with the way they are taught. The conclusion that Foot draws, then, is that there is no 
more reason to think that moral rules are categorical imperatives then that rules of 
etiquette are categorical imperatives. If reasons are not found for following the rules of 
either etiquette or morality, then one may reasonably not follow either. 16 
One might object: this notion of morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives 
works so long as one actually cares about morality. But even if one doesn't care about 
morality, isn't it the case that one ought to care? 17 This is an appeal to the kind of 
obligation that II goes all the way down. 111 8 Whatever the facts about how one feels about 
moral imperatives, precisely because they are moral imperatives one is obligated, 
thoroughly. This is precisely the 'feeling' that Foot thinks is nothing more than an 
accident of the way morality is taught and enforced. That we think people are obligated 
in the strong sense to care about moral considerations just reflects the seriousness with 
which we take moral considerations, not anything about the nature of morality itself. 
Here, Foot thinks that there is no such thing as this sort of overarching 'ought'-or at least 
she is convinced that no adequate account has been given of this ought. On her view this 
overarching 'ought' is a result of the fear that if people find out that there is no such thing 
as an ultimate obligation with respect to morality, then there will be a wholesale 
16 Ibid., 312. 
17 Ibid. , 315 . 
18 Williams, 188. 
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abandonment of the 'sinking' morality ship. Her contention is that it is more likely that 
people will appreciate moral considerations and respond positively. 
It is important to note that Foot's analysis is not merely a claim about why 
obligation carries with it this feeling of necessity. It also is an implicit thesis about the 
origin and nature of moral obligation. Foot's thesis is that this emphatic ought, that ought 
from which we "feel ourselves unable to escape," 19 is an "illusion" and that it is nothing 
more than an attempt to give the moral ought a "magic force. 11 20 We try to give 
obligation this magic force because we fear that if people find out that morality is not a 
system of categorical imperatives, then no one will be moral. 21 Insofar as moral 
obligation, then, is an illusion, Foot's thesis contains an implicit, and I think correct 
identification of moral obligation as, despite its cloak of "dignity" and rationality, in 
essence nothing but this feeling of necessity and universality. On her view, the feeling of 
necessity is simply a result of the way morality is taught. There is nothing in morality 
itself that gives rise to this feeling. Likewise, then, there is nothing in morality itself that 
gives rise to moral obligation, since moral obligation, that emphatic ought, arises from 
our desire to shore up the ranks of moral agents. 
3. Aquinas and Foot's thesis 
My task, for the rest of this thesis, is twofold. The issue is not only addressing 
why moral imperatives present themselves to us as necessary and universal, but further, 
why does morality present itself to us in the form of obligations in the first place? What 
19 Foot 310 
' 
20 Ibid. , 315. 
21 Ibid., 315. 
occasions obligation in some cases, but not in others? First, whatever part sociological 
factors may play in the feeling of obligation, I will argue that Aquinas gives us a more 
complete picture of why obligation presents itself to us as binding necessarily and 
universally. Second, I will argue that the origin or occasion that gives rise to obligation, 
far from being anything in the moral system itself, is rather a failure in the virtue of 
charity. Below, I will first outline Aquinas's ethical theory, and show how the structure 
of the theory addresses the feeling of necessity associated with moral commands. Then I 
will show how Aquinas's claim that charity as the highest of the virtues insofar as it 
properly orders us to our final end, God, creates the context for obligation. 
3.1 Aquinas's Teleological Eudaimonism 
Aquinas thinks that for any action to be called properly human, that action must 
issue from a person's reason and will-the action must be deliberately willed (Ia Ilae q. 
1 ).22 Certainly people perform actions all the time that are not deliberately willed-
scratching one's ear absent mindedly, for instance. But these actions, though actions of a 
person, are not properly human actions since they do not arise from what is properly 
human, reason. What separates humans from other beings that act is reason. So, for an 
action to be properly human, it must be from reason. Reason is related to will in an 
important way. For Aquinas, the object of the will is the "end and the good" (Ia Ilae q. 8, 
22 For a nice summary of Aquinas's eudaimonism, see Goerg Wieland, 
"Happiness (Ia Ilae, qq.1-5)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, 
D.C.:Georgetown University Press, 2002): 57-68; or, Ralph Mcinerny, Ethica 
Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy Of Thomas Aquinas, Rev. Ed. (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University Of America Press, 1997), 12-59. 
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a. 1 ). 23 The will always moves toward what it perceives to be good. It is reason that 
provides the will its object. Whatever the reason perceives as good it provides to the will 
as the will' s object. All human action, then, must be for an end. 
Certainly people may have many different ends. Even in action, an action might 
be for several ends at once. I may go for a walk to stretch my legs, to get some exercise, 
and to please my wife who thinks I sit around too much. But for Aquinas, like Aristotle, 
there must be only one last end for a person, otherwise the will would never be motivated 
to move (I Ilae q. 1, aa.4-5). The many ends for which one may act must always be 
under the aspect of the final end. For it is the final end that ultimately motivates the will 
to move. While a person may recognize several ends as worthy of pursuit, those ends 
will be ordered in a kind of hierarchy in such a way as to lead to a final end. 
Consequently, one human cannot have many last ends. The will cannot be directed to 
several things that it takes to be final ends. The last end for humans is the good. Aquinas 
defines 'good' as that which is perfective (Iae, q.5).24 This is because Aquinas thinks that 
'good' and 'being' are really the same essence, though under two different aspects. What 
is good is what best actualizes the kind of thing that something is. What is good for 
humans, then, is whatever it is that perfectly actualizes the kind of thing that humans are. 
Furthermore, humans desire all that they desire for the sake of the last end. This 
is because all naturally desire their perfection, what is ultimately good for them. 
23 All quotes from Aquinas's Summa are from the Benziger Bros. Edition, 1947, 
trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, accessed on-line from 
http: //www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/home.html, 28 March 2003 . 
24 For an account of Aquinas's understanding of goodness and its relationship to 
being, see Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Being and Goodness," in Being and 
Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. 
Scott MacDonald (lthica: Cornell University Press, 1991): 98-128. 
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Whatever anyone desires, she "desire[s] it under the aspect of good" (Ia Hae q. 1 a.6) For 
Aquinas, the notion of valuation is built into the concept of the good. Anything that a 
person desires, she desires insofar as she conceives it to be good for her. At the very least, 
she must desire it as conducive to her final good, if not actually her final good. In fact, a 
person desires only what she conceives to be her good. Because Aquinas defines the 
good as that which is perfective of the agent, one desires what one conceives of as being 
perfective of her. 
So, any one person must have only one final end. But furthermore, this ultimate 
end is the same for all persons (Ia Hae q. 1 a. 7). On Aquinas's analysis, to speak of the 
last end common to all, we must approach it under two aspects. On the one hand, there is 
the last end itself. On the other, there is the realization of that last end. For Aquinas, on a 
general level, all humans share one and only one last end, namely "the fulfillment of their 
perfection" (Ia Hae q. 1 a. 7). As we noted above, Aquinas defines goodness in terms of 
perfection. Insofar as good and being are the same in essence, they both speak of 
perfection in existence. At this level of generality Aquinas thinks all would agree. But of 
course, many differ on what they take to be in fact perfective of them. Some think that 
what constitutes their final perfection is pleasure, others riches. Aquinas accounts for the 
empirical differences in ends that people pursue not in that there really are many different 
ends, but that people conceive of there being many different ends. On Aquinas's view, 
what ultimately is perfective of humans is union with God, or the vision of God's essence 
(Ia Hae q. 3 a. 8). Though every created thing has as its end God, this realization of the 
end is not possible for other creatures which lack rationality. We will come back to how 
Aquinas conceives of the vision of God in the last section. 
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For Aquinas, then, what one desires is her final end formally conceived. 
According to Aquinas, anything that one desires one desires insofar as one conceives of it 
as good for her. In any human action, then, insofar as human actions are ordered to the 
final end, one always acts for the good formally considered. Any action aims at what the 
agent takes to be perfective of herself. Consequently, for Aquinas valuation is built into 
human action. More specifically, insofar as the pursuit for a person's good is viewed 
under the aspect of the moral life, all humans are engaged in the moral task insofar as any 
agent, in virtue of performing human acts, pursues the good formally considered. 
What is important for my purposes is to notice the structure of Aquinas's moral 
theory up to this point. For Aquinas, everyone is engaged in morally valuational acts just 
by virtue of performing properly human acts. This is because everyone, on Aquinas's 
view, acts for what she conceives to be perfective of her. She just does desire her own 
good. Even the one who claims to reject all valuations of good and bad, or good and evil, 
on Aquinas's view is still acting under the aspect of the good. This is because reason 
always presents to the will what the reason takes to be perfective of the agent; and 
because Aquinas defines the good in terms of what is perfective of the agent, the one who 
forswears all valuations would not reject the valuations of good and bad if she really 
thought such a rejection was somehow not perfective of her nature. So, on Aquinas's 
view, there is no such thing as a truly amoral person, even iflots of people think they are 
amoral. 
With respect to Foot's analysis of the feeling of necessity of moral imperatives, 
applying Aquinas's account to morality gives us a way to account for the force of non-
hypothetical moral imperatives without having to construe that force as a mere accident 
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of the way morality is taught. On Aquinas's account everyone does in fact have reasons 
to care about moral considerations in virtue of the fact that everyone, because of their 
nature as humans, pursues the good formally considered. Everyone should refrain from 
stealing, for instance, not because the imperative "do not steal" is a categorical 
imperative. Rather, because refraining from stealing is good for humans, and everyone 
just does pursue their good, even if many often mistake what is in fact perfective of them. 
Consequently, that we feel the force of moral imperatives is by virtue of the fact that no 
one can escape their reach because every agent pursues the good and consequently cares 
about moral considerations, at least under the formal aspect goodness. On this account, 
the force of moral imperatives depends upon the fact that moral imperatives are those 
imperatives that specify the actions that are perfective of humans, and therefore good. 
However, because everyone on Aquinas's account just does pursue the good, we do not 
need to construe moral imperatives as categorical imperatives. Their universality and 
feeling of necessity is a result of the fact that everyone meets the implied conditional of 
moral imperatives. No one escapes their reach not because they are categorical, but 
because of a natural fact about humans. They in fact possess no necessity of themselves. 
Rather, they feel necessary because of the necessity that is a result of the kind of 
creatures humans are 
Up to this point, I have outlined Aquinas's account of morality and have argued 
that his view of the structure of human life can be used to account for the feeling of force 
of moral imperatives . Now I want to look more carefully at Aquinas's account of the 
relationship between law and virtue. As I hope to show below, one of the distinct 
advantages of approaching Foot's problem from the perspective of Aquinas is that we can 
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account not only for the feeling of obligation, but also for the occasion for obligation in 
the context of an overall virtue ethic. Why does morality present itself to us as something 
obligatory? This wi 11 require us to look first at Aquinas's account of natural law, and then 
see how law in general is situated in the context of Aquinas's virtue ethic. The claim will 
be that for Aquinas, law in general is secondary to virtue. When one is perfected in 
virtue, the law fails to bind since one does those acts which tum out to be in accord with 
the law from virtue rather than from obligation to the law. On this picture, obligation is 
not merely the result of the way moral imperatives are taught and enforced. Rather, 
obligation arises when there is a failure of charity. 
3.2 Natural Law in Aquinas 
Aquinas is often read as though natural law is the primary notion in his moral 
theory. However, this view is mistaken. Aquinas's natural law theory must be read in 
light of his teleological eudaimonism. That natural law is generally taken to be central to 
Aquinas's ethical theory is surprising given the position of Aquinas's exposition on law 
within the Summa. The entire Second part of the Summa discusses humans and human 
life. It begins, as we noted above, with a eudaimonistic picture of human moral action. 
Aquinas then discusses habits and the virtues. Finally, at the end, Aquinas takes up the 
issue of law. Of the 114 questions of the first part of the second part of the Summa, only 
24 are related to law. Of those 24 questions, the last 6 discuss the relationship of grace to 
law, and the 11 questions before those are concerned with the Old Law and the New Law. 
This means that of the 114 questions of the second part, only 8 discuss the nature of laws 
and the different kinds of laws. Of those 8, only one, question 94, is devoted to the 
natural law. Now certainly, a hand count of numbers does not make the case that natural 
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law does not hold the primary place in Aquinas's ethics. But at the very least, the 
relatively insignificant space Aquinas devotes to law, and to natural law specifically, begs 
for an explanation. I do not have the space to lay out the arguments for the claim that law 
is secondary to virtue in Aquinas. Others have done that much better than I can. 25 
Rather, I want to look at a consequence of the claim for Aquinas's account of the first 
precept of the natural law. 
In Ia Hae, q. 94, a. 2 of the Summa, Aquinas draws an analogy between the first 
principle of understanding and the first principle of practical reason. In understanding, 
the first principle is the law of non-contradiction. All the precepts of understanding 
follow from this first principle. Similarly, with respect to practical reason the first 
principle is "that good is to be sought and done, and evil to be avoided": 
"Now as 'being' is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so 
'good' is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, 
which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of 
good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the 
notion of good, viz. that 'good is that which all things seek after.' Hence this is the 
first precept of law, that 'good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be 
avoided.' All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that 
whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good ( or evil) 
belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided." (Ia 
Hae, q. 94, a. 2) 
Just before this passage, Aquinas says that the first principles of both practical reason and 
theoretical reason are self-evident, or known in themselves. In the case of theoretical 
reason, the first thing the mind grasps in any operation of theoretical reason is the notion 
25 See, for instance, Daniel Mark Nelson, The Priority of Prudence: Virtue and 
Natural Law In Thomas Aquinas and the Implications For Modern Ethics (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992); and Martin Rhonheimer, 
Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomistic View of Moral Autonomy, trans. By 
Gerald Malsbary (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000). 
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of 'being.' 'Being' is included in, and always at least partly constitutive of whatever one 
knows. Thus, any operation of theoretical reason includes the notion of being. Included 
in the notion of being is the principle that something cannot both be and not be. That is, 
when one grasps anything at all, that apprehension is predicated upon the notion of being 
and that the notion of being includes within it the principle that the thing grasped cannot 
both be, and not be. Hence, we get the first principle of theoretical reasoning: We cannot 
at the same time affirm and deny the same thing (Ia Hae, q. 94, a. 2). 
As being is the first thing the mind apprehends, so the good is the first thing the 
mind apprehends when using practical reason. This is because every agent acts for an 
end, and to be an end carries with it the formality of goodness. What is good? Aquinas 
has previously told us that 'good' is what all things seek. But furthermore, all things 
naturally seek what is perfective of them, or what completes them. Thus, formally 
considered, when the mind uses practical reason to consider what to do, it first and 
unavoidably grasps the notion of goodness-seeking what is perfective of the agent in the 
same way that upon any act of apprehension, the intellect first grasps being. As being is 
always included in any operation of theoretical reasoning, so the notion of goodness is 
always present in any operation of practical reasoning. Furthermore, since goodness 
always includes the notion of that which is perfective of the agent (at least as far as the 
agent can see), and since all things just naturally do pursue what is perfective of them (at 
least as far as they can tell), the first principle of practical reasoning is: pursue good, 
avoid evil. This is the first principle of natural law. Aquinas says that all of the other 
precepts of natural law follow from this first, just like all the principles of theoretical 
reasoning follow from the first principle of theoretical reasoning. 
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Consider the analogy between the first principle of theoretical reasoning and the 
first principle of practical reasoning. In the case of goodness, goodness formally 
considered is that which is perfective of humans. On the broadest level, goodness 
formally considered includes only the notion of what is perfective without any claim 
about what in fact is perfective. But of course, while everyone agrees on goodness 
formally considered, people often have different beliefs about what in fact is perfective of 
them. They might be wrong about what in fact is perfective of humans, but goodness 
formally considered always presents itself in any moral deliberation. Likewise, 'being' 
formally considered always presents itself in any theoretical reasoning. But of course, 
people might disagree about what in fact exists. So, for instance, cosmologists still 
disagree over whether or not there is any such thing as 'dark matter' in the universe- that 
is, whether or not dark matter has being in the substantive sense. But those same 
cosmologists could not disagree that if in fact there is dark matter, we can not say of dark 
matter that it both does and does not exist. This is because being formally considered 
always presents itself to the mind and includes the principle that a thing cannot both be 
and not be. 
In the case of apprehending something, one does not need to be told the first 
principle of theoretical reasoning- one just does it in any case of apprehension. Were 
one to deny this principle we would be at a loss of what to make of such a claim, other 
than that the person either just misunderstands or is somehow lacking in rational capacity. 
But notice, to cite the first principle to one who does not already accept and act on the 
principle will have no impact since any act of apprehension already includes the 
principle. Likewise, on Aquinas's account, when one acts intentionally, onejust is 
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pursing the good and avoiding evil. The first principle of practical reason, "pursue the 
good and avoid evil ," like the first principle of theoretical reasoning is always included in 
the act of performing a properly human act. Were one to deny the first principle of 
practical reason we would be at a loss except to say that the person simply 
misunderstands the principle since in virtue of acting intentionally, the person already 
acts on the principle. Citing the principle as an imperative to be followed will have no 
force on one who denies the principle in the first place. Thus, the first principle of 
practical reasoning, what in fact is constitutive of the natural law at its broadest level, can 
not be the first imperative that grounds a moral system since it is rather descriptive of 
how any intentional agent acts . 
But of course, that anyone by virtue of acting does pursue the good does not mean 
that everyone does what in fact is good anymore than that someone grasps the first 
principle of apprehension thereby knows what in fact is real. So, just in virtue of being a 
moral agent everyone just does abide by the first precept of the natural law. Notice, this 
is not because the law binds everyone to act in this way. In fact, on Aquinas's account no 
moral agent pursues the good formally considered as a result of natural law. Moral 
agents pursue the good formally considered as a result of being the kind of creature that 
moral agents are- rational, deliberate creatures. It is simply a fact about being human-
rational agents just do pursue the good formally considered; that is, they just do pursue 
what they think is perfective of them. The articulate of the natural law is a result of 
reflection on this fact. Consequently, all moral agents just do follow the first precept of 
the natural law. But of course, since many people disagree about what in fact is 
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perfective of them, many people will disagree on which other precepts of the natural law 
follow. 
For Aquinas the natural law includes all of the particular laws that are derivable 
from the first principle. So, for instance, the imperatives about procreation and murder 
are, on Aquinas' view, part of the natural law. Aquinas does, however, draw a line 
between what is self-evident in natural law, the first principle, and what is not evident in 
natural law, the subsequent derived imperatives. There is, in a sense, two aspects under 
which we might approach natural law-the first precept and what flows from it (Ia Ilae q. 
94, a. 2) . Everyone acts on the first precept (Do good, avoid evil) by virtue of being 
human. But not everyone pursues what other precepts are in fact contained in the natural 
law because not everyone recognizes those other precepts. Hence, in Aquinas we can 
disagree with him about what flows from the first precept because he or we might be 
wrong about that. Thus, though we might disagree with Aquinas about some particular 
imperatives derived from the natural law, we need not disagree about his structural point. 
Consequently, the first principle of natural law is to do the good and avoid evil-
but the natural law isn't providing the agent with any new 'command' or 'imperative' to 
which one is obligated. The impulse to pursue good is already built into the intentional 
action since by virtue of acting intentionally one is pursuing the good, at least formally 
considered. Furthermore, no 'command' is needed since the agent just does pursue the 
good by virtue of acting intentionally. If Aquinas means this first principle to be a 
'command' in the sense of obligating one to a certain course of action, then the command 
is redundant since by virtue of acting intentionally one is already pursuing the good 
without any mention of obligation- it's j ust what intentional agents do. So, "pursue the 
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good" is not an imperative to which one is obligated. It is a summation of a natural fact. 
As Rhonheimer argues, "when Thomas says ... that the first principle of the practical 
reason is based on the 'nature of the good' ... which is that 'good is what all things seek' 
. . .. he does not mean that the practical reason is based on this 'sentence' , rather, it is 
based upon a fact that is only reflectively formulated and grasped in it, and this is the fact 
of the 'seekable'."26 The first precept of natural law, then, is not an imperative one is 
obligated to follow. What is important for us to note is that whatever else he may or 
may not make of obligation, obligation can not hold the primary and defining place in 
Aquinas's ethical theory. Rather, as we shall see, that role belongs to the virtue of 
charity. 
3.3 Virtue and Law 
Natural law, then, has a different connection to virtue than is usually conceived on 
the picture of Aquinas as a traditional natural law ethicist. In the following section, I will 
outline Goemer's account of the relationship between law and virtue in Aquinas, and a 
critique of Goemer's account from Pamela Hall. As we will see, Goemer's account, 
while moving us in the right direction, needs to be modified in light of Aquinas's account 
of the Old and the New Laws . This will set the context for further specifying why it is 
that morality presents itself to us in the form of obligations . 
Goemer's thesis on Aquinas actually occurs in two parts , his two essays "On 
Thomistic atural Law: The Bad Man's View of Thomistic Natural Right"
27 and 
26 Rhonheimer, 71. 
27 E. A. Goerner, "On Thomistic atural Law: The Bad Man's 
View of Thomistic atural Right," Political Theory 7, no. 1 (Feb. 1979), 101-122. 
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"Thomistic atural Right: The Good Man's View of Thomistic atural Law."
2 Goerner 
argues that it is not right to read Aquinas as a traditional natural law theori t, where a 
natural law theorist is "one who holds that the standard of natural morality is a law or 
laws in the sense of universally valid propositions about what is right or wrong, by 
nature, to do or not do. "29 This is because for Aquinas, natural law is second best to 
virtue. Goerner argues that the function of law is merely to train those lacking in virtues 
so that they may attain the virtues. Law, then, is intended to implement God's ordering of 
the universe in the face of vice and sin. Aquinas is, rather than a natural law theorist, a 
natural right theorist, one who holds that the rightness or wrongness of actions is not 
derived from universally valid moral laws. Rather, the rightness or wrongness of an 
action is derived from the judgment of the virtuous person. I find Goemer's account 
helpful, but incorrect in one important point. Before I outline Goerner's argument and an 
important objection from Pamela Hunt, I will briefly discuss Aquinas's view of virtue, 
and how the purpose of laws is to train people in virtue. This will be important for 
Goemer's conclusion. 
Goerner begins by noting an important distinction in Aquinas . Aquinas 
distinguishes between external principles of action and internal principles of action.
30 
Intrinsic principles of action are the virtues. The virtues are internal because the actions 
arise not from coercion by something outside of the agent, but because of a quality of the 
agent's soul. Insofar as the agent possesses the virtues, the agent perforrns actions out of 
28 Ibid. , "Thomistic Natural Right: The Good Man 's View of Thomistic atural 
Law " Political Theory 11 , no . 3 (Aug. 1983), 393-418. 
29 Goerner Thomistic atural Law " 102. 
30 Ibid. , 108. 
23 
a habit, or disposition to pursue the good. But of course many people are not virtuou . 
They require external principles of action in order to do what is right. There are two 
kinds of external principles of action. First, law is implemented by God to achieve God's 
purposes even though His purposes are actively opposed by the vicious . Those who do 
not, by their own internal principles of virtue do what is good, do what is good in 
subjection to the law. The other external principle is grace. Grace is external in the sense 
that it is given by God to those who would otherwise lack the internal principle of virtue. 
Grace, however, is not external in the way that law is; for grace infuses the recipient with 
virtue so that the agent in the end does freely act from virtue. 
For Aquinas, like Aristotle, virtues are kinds of habits .31 Habits are qualities 
insofar as they dispose something well or ill in relation to a thing's nature or end (Ia Hae, 
q. 49 aa. 1, 4). They are durable and difficult to change since they are patterns of activity. 
Aquinas argues that habits are a necessary quality of acts because habits keep actions 
from being random. A habit is a perfected disposition, or a disposition that is solid, 
stable, and hard to change. Aquinas uses the metaphor of a boy growing to be a man to 
illustrate the relation between dispositions and habits. Habits are dispositions that have 
'matured' and are therefore 'hardened' and durable (Ia Hae, q. 49, a. 2) . 
With respect to morality, we are interested in certain kinds of habits. For 
Aquinas, like Aristotle, what is distinctive about humans is the presence of reason. What 
is perfective of humans will be found in connection with reason . Consequently, there 
31 For an account of the differences between Aristotle and Aquinas on habits and 
virtues , see Bonnie Kent, "Habits and Virtues (la Ilae qq. 49-70) ," in Th e Ethic of 
Aquinas ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 2002): 
116-130. 
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must be the presence of reason for there to be habits in the moral sen e. Con ider the 
sensitive powers of the soul. We can consider the sensitive powers in two ways. On the 
one hand, the sensitive powers act from natural instinct. On this aspect they are ordained 
to one thing "even as nature is" (Ia IIae q. 50, a. 3). On the other hand, the sensitive 
powers can participate in the rational faculty of the soul at least insofar as they are 
governed, or guided by reason. Under the aspect of reason, the natural instincts of the 
sensitive powers might be ordered to many different things. For instance, the instinct for 
sex might be ordered to procreation or to sexual pleasure. It is this variety in orientation 
that allows for the presence of habit- because there is variation, there is space to be well 
or ill disposed with respect to something. It is reason that guides the natural instincts to 
their proper ends. The sensitive powers of the soul do have the natural "aptitude" to obey 
reason, and so they can have habits in them. These habits are what Aquinas and Aristotle 
call the moral virtues. 
Not only are their habits with respect to the sensitive powers of the soul, there are 
also habits of the intellectual powers of the soul (Ia Ilae q. 50, a. 4). The sensitive powers 
are rational only by participation, insofar as they are governed by the rational powers of 
the soul. The intellectual virtues, however, are virtues insofar as they are by necessity of 
reason since they are in the intellect itself. Finally, the virtue of justice is related to the 
power of the will (Ia. IIae. Q. 50, a. 5). Every power which can be directed toward many 
different ends must have habits to be either ill or well disposed to that end which is 
proper to it. The will is a rational power, and so like other rational powers, either 
properly or accidentally it can be directed towards various acts. Consequently, the will 
too must have a habit by which it is ill or well disposed to act. Justice is the habit of the 
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will since justice i the virtue by which , "'men will and do that v hich i ju t"' ( Ia Ilac q. 
50, a. 5) .
32 
Virtue is a certain kind of habit. Specifically, they are excellent habit (Ia 
Ilae, q. 55 , a. 2) . 
What, then, is the cause of habits and specifically of virtues? Aquina says that 
there can be two causes of habits. First, there are causes of habits from nature. (Ia Ilae, 
a. 51 , a. l ). Nature endows humans with certain capacities. These capacities are natural 
to the human species- without them the being is no longer human, although the 
capacities can be present in different degrees in different people. So, for instance, in one 
sense the virtues associated with the intellect are caused by nature at least insofar as the 
intellect's capacity for virtue is a result of nature. 
But, though nature gives humans the capacity for virtue, with respect to the moral 
life, habits are caused by acts (I. Ilae q. 51, a. 3). Aquinas employs a metaphor here: like 
a fire spreads gradually, so with the repetition of acts habits grow gradually. One act 
does not a habit make. This is because the active principle, reason, in properly human 
actions can not overcome the appetitive powers all at once. It takes practice, the 
repetition of acts . So, the kind of habits we are interested in, the virtues, those habits 
which well dispose us to our proper end as humans, are acquired by practice. 
With his account of how habits are acquired in mind, consider Aquinas's account 
of law. Aquinas begins his exposition on law by outlining the essence of law. First, law 
is a "rule and measure of acts" because the rule and measure of human acts is properly 
reason (la Hae q. 90, a. 1 ). Law is properly directed to the common good . This is 
because the first principle with respect to human acts is always the final end of humans. 
32 Aquinas is here quoting Ari totle, Nicomachean Ethics, V I. 
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Law then, "must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness" (Ia Hae q. 
90, a. 2). After noting the various kinds of laws, Aquinas discusses the effects of the law 
in question 92. In article 1, Aquinas first asks whether the effect of the law is to make 
men good. The first objection argues "no" because humans are good through virtue. 
Aquinas does not disagree, but answers that it is law that leads its subjects to the virtues 
proper to their end. Aquinas quotes Aristotle who says that by habituating subjects to 
good works, legislators make them good. The purpose of law, then, is to "lead its subjects 
to their proper virtue. "(Ia Hae q. 92, a. 1) Aquinas recognizes that it is virtue as the 
perfection of qualities of the soul as oriented to the last end that properly make one good. 
But it is laws that habituate one to the virtues. 
For Aquinas, all authentic law is rooted in and expressive of eternal law.33 The 
Eternal law is nothing other than Divine wisdom moving all things to their proper end. 
Eternal law is properly God's providence over creation. Everything participates in eternal 
law insofar as everything is guided by God's providence. The three other kinds of laws 
that Aquinas identifies, the natural law, the Divine law, and human law, are all rooted in 
God's providence and work to move creation, and specifically humans, to the end proper 
to the species. 
In question 95, Aquinas takes up a discussion of human law specifically. He 
notes in article 1 that humans have a natural aptitude for virtue. But, because of human 
fallibility and because of the destructive effects of sin, humans are not naturally virtuous 
in the sense of actually possessing the virtues by nature. Perfection in virtue must be 
33 Pamela Hall, "The Old Law and the New Law (Ia Hae, qq. 98-108)," in The 
Ethics Of Aquinas ed. By Stephen J. Pope, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2002), 194. 
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acquired by training, through practice in performing the acts of virtue. But some, perhaps 
all, need training through the fear of punishment to refrain from evil and practice the acts 
of virtue. This is because humans, though always acting for their good formally 
considered, continually misidentify what is in fact perfective of them. The reason for 
laws, then, is to habituate people in the acts that are proper to their end. Human laws are 
passed by rulers of practical judgment as guides to virtue. For a law to be a proper law, it 
must be derived from the natural law, which of course is rooted in God's eternal law. But 
of course, not all human laws in fact do habituate humans to their proper end. There are 
wicked rulers who pass wicked laws. For Aquinas, it is only those just laws, those laws 
which in fact are conducive of the proper end, that have the power to bind a person in 
conscience. (Ia Hae q. 96, a. 4). 
Goerner argues that it is in this context that Aquinas's account of law must be 
read. Virtue, as we've seen, is something that one must learn through training and 
practice. The law is an important tutor in the instruction of virtue. The vicious person is 
not skilled at pursuing the good. The law instructs the vicious person in how to pursue 
the good, and motivates the vicious person to pursue the good out of fear of punishment. 
The goal of law is to make people virtuous. With enough practice one acquires the habit 
of acting rightly and becomes virtuous (Ia Hae q. 95, a. 1). On Goerner's analysis, once 
one acquires the virtues, the law no longer applies. This is because the purpose of the 
law is to train in virtue. Once one has acquired virtue, one no longer needs the law. 
To say that one no longer needs the law because one has acquired virtue might be 
interpreted in at least two ways. 34 One might argue that the difference between the bad 
34 Goerner, "On Thomistic Natural Law," 110-111. 
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person (the one who does what is right because coerced by the law) and the good person 
(the one who does what is right out of love for the good) is merely a difference of a 
motive. The bad person lacks the motive of love for the good. On this account, the 
content of the law and the content of virtuous activity are identical. The good person 
does all that the law says, and never violates the law, though the good person does what 
the law says not out of fear of punishment by the law, but "because of an habitual 
inclination to do what is right. "35 She does it not out of the motive of fear or duty, but 
out of the motive oflove for the good in the manner of the virtues. 
But for Goerner, the difference between law and virtue is not merely motive. On 
Goemer's account, Aquinas accepts Aristotle's notion that the virtuous person is 
ultimately the judge of what counts as right. Laws are generalizations, rules of thumb. 
But laws are limited in their applicability. The person of virtue weighs the law and the 
circumstances, and at times will decide that following the law is in fact not the right thing 
to do. In this sense, law is inferior to virtue because virtue can override law. Goerner 
argues that in matters of legal justice, there will be times when if the law is applied, the 
good will not be implemented. Consequently, the virtuous judge may decide that in some 
particular case, the intention of the law would have it that the law not be applied. 
"Equity" demands that at times the virtuous person may need to judge outside the bounds 
of the law if the law when applied would result in injustice.36 In Goerner's phraseology, 
the virtuous person "transcends" the law. The virtuous person transcends the law because 
ultimately it is the intention of the law giver that determines what is right, not the 
35 Goerner, "On Thomistic Natural Right," 398. 
36 Ibid. , 410. 
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command of the law itself.37 Goerner's conclusion, then, is that since Aquinas recognizes 
the priority of the virtues, and by extension the priority of the judgment of the virtuous 
person, Aquinas's natural law theory must be understood as in service to the natural right. 
Pamela Hall objects to Goerner's formulation of the transcendence of the law by 
the virtuous person.38 Hall argues that for Aquinas, practical wisdom is not the creator of 
the law, rather it is the way in which we "exhibit knowledge of our good or end in a 
practically effective way."39 Prudence is "rooted in and guided by the natural law."40 
Virtue, then, can never transcend the law in the way that Goerner describes. 
Hall makes her case from Aquinas's treatment of the Ten Commandments. For 
Aquinas, the Decalogue contains the moral precepts that in principle humans should be 
able to derive from the natural law. However, because of deficiencies in human intellect, 
either because of sin or because of nature, these principles are not clear to humans ( at 
least not clear to all humans). Consequently, God revealed in the form of the decalogue 
the moral principles that are derivable from natural law. But, asks Hall, if these 
principles are revealed by God as His laws, then how could Aquinas be arguing that these 
laws, God's laws, can be transcended? How could God's laws be imperfect in their 
implementation? Hall's answer is that according to all that Aquinas has said in the first 
part of the Summa about God's providential ordering of the universe, and the way that 
ordering is expressed in the eternal laws, related as they are to the natural law, Aquinas 
37 Goerner 410-411. 
38 Pamela Hall, "Goerner On Thomistic Natural Law," Political Theory 18, no. 4, 
638-649. 
39 Ibid., 644. 
40 Ibid., 646. 
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cannot think that the natural law is transcendable. Thus, on Hall's reading, Aquinas does 
not think that the moral principles as derivable from the natural law can be cast aside at 
the judgment of the virtuous person. 
I think Hall is right to argue that the natural law can never be transcended as 
Goerner claims. However, we can say more in favor of Goemer's view that the law is 
secondary to virtue, even transcending virtue in a sense, though not in the way Goerner 
describes. When Goerner says that the person of virtue transcends the law, he means 
that the standard of right and wrong is not the law, but the judgment of the person. I 
think Goerner is right to claim that the standard of right and wrong for the virtuous 
person is not the law. Nevertheless, though the standard is not the law, as I will argue 
below with respect to Aquinas's account of the Old and the New Law, the person of 
virtue always performs acts that tum out to be in accord with the law, even though the 
law is not the standard of the person and the person does not act from the law. I am 
arguing, contrary to Goerner, that in fact the difference between the law and virtue is not 
a difference of content-the virtuous person always does the works of the law that are in 
accord with the actions commanded by the law. However, this does not mean that the 
law is the standard for virtue. This is because what is right for humans is derivable from 
what is good for humans; and what is good for humans is what is perfective of humans. 
Virtue and law both aim at what is perfective of humans. Virtue is the quality of the soul 
such that the agent has the disposition of seeking and doing what is perfective of being 
human out of love for the good. The law is the imperatives which aim at fostering virtue 
by commanding through external coercion those actions that are perfective of humans. 
This law is based, then, on human nature as created by God. They are the actions that 
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result in the full actualization of humans as humans insofar as they train one in the 
virtues, though of course in themselves the works of the law are not fully perfective since 
they are done out of coercion rather than love of the good. Virtue and law, then are both 
expressions of the same natural fact as created by God. Law, however, is the inferior 
expression of that natural fact since the purpose of law is to train for virtue. To see how 
this captures an important notion of transcendence, we need to look very briefly at 
Aquinas's account of the Old and the New Laws. 
The Old law contains the moral precepts that are derivable from the natural law 
(Ia Ilae q. 100, a. 1). The Decalogue is the most important expression of the Old Law. 
The New law is the gospel of Christ, which, whatever else it may be, Aquinas takes to 
endow the agent with grace, which infuses the person with the theological virtues. The 
difference between the Old Law and the New Law is not a difference of the content of the 
moral imperatives. It is rather a difference of their "perfection and imperfection" (Ia Hae, 
q. 107, a 1). He notes that one may perform acts that a virtuous person would perform in 
two ways. First, one may perform the acts from virtue itself. Second, however, one may 
perform the act as coerced by law. Of course, in this second case, the act would not be 
virtuous, but it would be in accord with what the virtuous person would do and ideally 
would be a step on the way to virtue insofar as the law is a tutor in virtue. Aquinas says 
that those who do not yet have virtue are still directed toward virtuous acts by "threat of 
punishment, or the promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the like" 
(Ia Hae, q. 107, a. 1). The Old Law was given to people who were imperfect in virtue 
and bound them externally. The Old Law, then, insofar as it was external, was a law of 
fear since it directed conformity with the law through coercion. 
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The New Law, on the other hand, infuses the person with the theological virtues 
through grace. Rather than containing different moral precepts the New Law contains a 
different orientation to acts that are perfective of humans. This is because the person of 
virtue performs virtuous acts out of love-"such persons are inclined of themselves to 
those objects, not as to something foreign but as to something of their own" (Ia Ilae, q. 
107, a. 1 ). Aquinas derives this understanding of the New Law from the Bible, where 
God promises to write the law on the hearts of people. By this, Aquinas understands the 
Bible to promise not a change in the moral law, but a new orientation to the law, where 
one does the works of the law not from external coercion, but from one's own internal 
motivation. The New Law is more difficult from the perspective of the person who lacks 
virtue because it elicits perfect conformity, not only in outward deed, but also in inward 
motivation and spirit. For the person of virtue, on the other hand, the virtuous deeds that 
were likewise required by the Old Law become 'easy' precisely because they are done 
from virtue, from love, rather than from an external impulse such as punishment or 
reward (Ia Ilae, q. 107, a. 4). 
We are now in a position to see how transcendence of the law by the virtuous 
person should be characterized. The function of law is to train people in virtue. On 
Goerner's view, once one has become virtuous, the law is transcended such that the 
measure of what is right for the virtuous person is no longer law, but virtue. So, a 
virtuous person might act in a way contrary to the letter of the law, but because they are 
rightly ordered to the intention of the law by virtue, they would be performing a right act. 
However, as Hall argues, because those laws are God's laws it is not right to claim that 
Aquinas understands this to mean that a person of virtue may, on occasion, need to break 
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the law. On my view, the person infused with grace does, nonetheless, transcend the law. 
But not because the person sometimes performs acts that are contrary to the law. Rather, 
it is because the person infused with virtue does not act from the law. For the person of 
virtue the law is neither the standard nor the source for moral human acts. The virtuous 
person acts from love of God. However, though she does not act from law insofar as she 
transcends law, because her actions are from virtue as ordered to God as her final end, 
she will perform acts that tum out to be in accordance with the law, though the law is 
neither the standard nor the source for her actions. She acts from the love of God as 
enabled by grace rather than from obedience to the law. 
It is important to note this relationship between law and virtue; for ultimately 
what is perfective of humans is "friendship" with God, or love of God. God is not loved 
by the person who only does what is perfective of humans out of fear of punishment by 
the law because even though the person seeks her perfection, she does not recognize God 
as her ultimate good. In this case, the person has not been sufficiently habituated to 
virtue. It is the person of virtue who is disposed to the good out of love for God that can 
attain friendship with God, even though it so happens, because of the way law and virtue 
are both related to human nature, that the person of virtue will never perform any acts 
that would in fact violate the law. So the person of perfect virtue does transcend the law 
in the sense that the person no longer acts from the law. This is important because as we 
will see below, obligation ends at virtue. 
4. Obligation as the Failure To Act From Charity 
We have already seen why moral imperatives present themselves to us with the 
feeling of necessity and universality. It is because of the natural fact that humans, in 
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virtue of performing properly human acts, always pursue the good. Now we are in a 
position to see what the occasion for obligation is in the first place. Why does morality 
present itself to us in the form of obligations? To see this, I will first outline John Hems' 
contention that obligation, rather than constituting the essence of morality, is a failure in 
love.
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On Hems' view, obligation arises when we fail to act out of love. Obligation 
would have us act toward those we do not love in the same manner we act toward those 
we do love. In Aquinas, the perfection of love is the theological virtue of charity. It is 
charity that rightly orders us to our final end, God. My contention will be that obligation 
is a failure in the virtue of charity. Those who are perfected in the virtue of charity do the 
actions that tum out to be commanded by moral imperatives out of love for God. They 
are perfected in virtue to the extent that their virtue is ordered to their final end by 
charity. On my view, obligation would have us act in the same way we would act if we 
sufficiently loved God. The feeling of universality and necessity of obligation arises 
from the natural fact that all humans do pursue their perfection. The occasion for 
obligation, the reason moral imperatives present themselves to us in the form of 
obligations is the failure to at from the virtue of charity. 
4.1 Love and Obligation 
We often take obligation to be what we should do in contrast to our desires. We 
may desire to get out of a sticky situation, but we tell the truth anyway because it is our 
duty to tell the truth. Hems thinks this characterization of obligation can not be right since 
41 See John Hems, "What Is Wrong With Obligation," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 22, no. 1 (Sep. 1961 ), 50-60. 
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it assumes a problematic view of desire, namely that desires as such are bad.42 But thi s is 
not the case. Hems asks us to consider the love a mother has for her child. We would 
say that the desire a mother has to care for her child is a good inclination. Indeed, we 
would say that the mother who cares for her child only from a sense of obligation is a 
"monster. "43 So, it is not right to contrast duty with desire in general. The issue, then, is 
whether one acts from a desire to do what one ought to do, or whether one acts from a 
desire to do what one ought not to do. Certainly, in particular cases we say that a 
particular desire is contrasted with one's duty. But by this we mean that we have a desire 
to do what we ought not do. Obligation, then, is not the containment of desire in general. 
It is rather the containment of opposing desires- "namely the desire to do and not to do 
what I ought to do. "44 
What, then, is the contrary of obligation if not desire in general? Hems claims 
that it is love. It is love which makes us desire to do what we do in fact not desire to do. 
"Love furnishes what was lacking in obligation-the desire to do the action in 
question."45 For instance, I normally do not desire to inflict pain on myself. However, I 
very much love my family and would without hesitation put myself in harms way to 
protect one of my family members. I would not do this grudgingly because I think I am 
obligated to do my best to protect those I love. My love for my family elicits a desire to 
do what I would otherwise not desire to do. Some actions of moral weight we may desire 
42 Ibid., 54. 
43 Ibid., 53. 
44 Ibid., 54. 
45 Ibid. 
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to do for a family member because we love them. But we would only do them for a 
stranger out of obligation. So obligation is really a failure of love. That we often feel an 
obligation to do something is to be explained by our failure to love. 
Hems claims that his conclusion that obligation is a failure in love is the answer to 
the question, "Why ought I to do what I ought to do?" The question traditionally is 
considered suspect from either of two perspectives. Either the question is taken to be 
irrational, or it is taken to be immoral. But, argues Hems, both of these conclusions 
depend upon particular interpretations of the question. First, the irrationality conclusion 
depends upon the interpretation of the question that results in a tautology (54-55).46 If 
obligation, as is often traditionally conceived, is of its own kind, then to ask the question 
is to ask, "Why is obligation what it is?" But, rather than asking that, one might be 
asking what in fact the reason for a particular action is. For instance, a person ought to 
give one of his coats to a freezing elderly man on the street. Why ought he to do what he 
ought to do, which in this case is give the man a coat? Because the man is freezing.
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That interpretation of the question is not irrational. On the other hand, it's not very 
interesting either. Second, the immorality conclusion likewise depends upon a particular 
interpretation of the question. On this interpretation of the question, one realizes what 
one's obligations are and why (to give the freezing man a coat because he is freezing) but 
still asks why she ought to do it. One might be asking, "Why ought I to help persons in 
need?" If that is what one means by "Why ought I to do what I ought to do?" that rightly 
46 Ibid., 54-55. 
47 Ibid., 56. 
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strikes us as immoral since generally that a person is in need and that one is in a posi tion 
to help is sufficient for recognizing and acting on one's obligations. 
But, argues Hems, these are not the only relevant interpretations of the question . 
Granting that people do experience the feeling of obligation, we might rather be asking 
this: Why is it that certain actions present themselves to me as obligations, rather than 
say, as a whim, or as something I just want to do? Why did this action present itself to 
me in the form of an obligation?48 Hems notes that on the modem view of morality there 
can be no positive answer to this question, for any positive answer would amount to a 
justification of obligation. But we can't be looking for a justification for obligation since 
moral obligations on the traditional view are supposed to be their own justification. If we 
could give a justification for them, they would no longer be moral obligations. They 
would be something else entirely. It would make obligation somehow derivative. 
Obligation on Hems' view must have a negative ground if it has any ground at all.
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Hems tells this story. Children grow up loving their parents, their brothers and 
their sisters. They soon learn to love others-friends and extended family members. But 
once children grow up, it is through obligation that they know to treat strangers as they 
would their friends-that is, they should not take advantage of them, seek their harm, etc. 
Obligation teaches them to act toward those strangers as they act towards those whom 
they love: "to fulfill an obligation is to act as though one loved."
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Of course, one should 
not pretend that one loves a stranger. That would be hypocritical. Rather, obligation 
regulates the way we act towards those for whom a desire to act in love is lacking. 
48 Ibid., 57 . 
49 Ibid., 58. 
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Should we act toward the person out of a true sense of love, that is if we genuinely cared 
for the person the way we love our family members then we would no longer feel the 
obligation, for we would feel love for the person. A mother does not care for her children 
out of the motivation of moral obligation, even though upon reflection she may well 
acknowledge that as a mother it is her obligation to care for her children. Rather she 
cares for her children because she loves them. Hems' conclusion is that our obligations 
tum out to be the actions we would have done anyway to those that we loved: 
"Obligation is grounded in a failure in love, and the answer to the question, 'Why ought I 
to do what I ought to do?' is this: 'Because I am lacking in love'." 51 
4.2 Charity and Obligation 
For Hems, then, obligation arises when there is a failure in love. I think the 
general structure of Hems' account is correct. However, approaching it from the 
perspective of Aquinas will require some revision since for Aquinas, charity is the 
highest of the virtues insofar as it rightly orders us to God. In this final section, I will 
outline Aquinas's account of God as the final good, and how charity rightly orders us to 
our final good. The conclusion will be, given the natural fact that all humans pursue what 
they take to be perfective of them, that God is the final end of humanity, and that charity 
rightly orders us to God, obligation is occasioned only when there is a failure to act from 
the virtue of charity 
Aquinas accounts for love under the aspect of the good. For Aquinas, the first 
object of human passion is always the good as the human intellect apprehends it. Good is 
50 Ibid., 
51 Ibid., 59. 
39 
always the proper cause oflove (Ia Hae q. 27, a. I ). However, that the fo rmal cau e of 
love is the good is not to deny that humans love different things in different way . One 
may love something not for itself, but because of the good that it gives one. Or, 
conversely, one may love something for its own sake, and Aquinas takes thi to mean that 
one desires the good for it. Furthermore, one may love what in fac t is not perfec ti ve of 
her. But this is because she has mistaken what is perfective of her. The good fo rmally 
considered is still the cause of love in this instance. 52 
What is in fact ultimately perfective of humans is union with God. In Ia Hae q. 3 
a.8 , Aquinas says that human happiness is contemplation of God, or the vision of God. 
This is because perfect human happiness is the cessation of striving. As rational 
creatures, humans acquire happiness by "knowing and loving God" (Ia Hae q. 1 a. 8). As 
rational creatures, reason must ultimately be satisfied in human happiness. Thjs occurs in 
the vision of God when humans will see God's essence. But the vision of God can not be 
separated from love for God. In Ila. Ilae q. 23 a. 6, Aquinas says that it is charity that 
"attains God Himself that we may rest in him." In article 1 of the same section, Aquinas 
defines charity as friendship with God . On Aquinas ' s account, following Aristotle, there 
are two requirements for friendship. First, one must wish the good for another. Second, 
there must be mutual love, or "communication." True friendship , then, is not self-
interested. One loves the other for the sake of the other. The infused virtue of charity is 
the quality of the soul of friendship with, or love of, God. By charity " there is 
communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to 
52 
See also, Kevin White, "The Passions Of the Soul (Ia Ilae, qq. 22-48)," in The 
Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2002), 108-109. 
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us" (Ila Ilae, q. 23 a. 1). Charity is simply the infu ion of perfected love by grace into 
the human. The object of charity is God as man's last end. Charity "i simply a friend hip 
of human beings with God in the same way that any friendship appear a an outstanding 
variation of love."53 
Since charity is what attains God in Himself, charity is the supreme of all of the 
virtues. It is under the aspect of the virtue of charity that all other virtues are ordered to 
their proper end. Aquinas says that charity is "included in the definition of virtue" (Ila 
Ilae q. 23 a. 4), and charity "is the form of the virtues" (Ila Ilae q. 23 a. 8). This is not 
because all other virtues are reducible to charity, or that only charity is necessary for the 
virtuous life. Rather, charity is the form of the virtues because charity, whose object is a 
person's final end-God-properly orders all other virtues to this end. While one could 
have a kind of virtue without charity, though only proximately and so long as the ends 
were not contrary to one's ultimate end, one cannot have perfect virtue without the virtue 
of charity. 
Love of others is under the aspect of the virtue of charity. Though humans love 
different things in different ways, ultimately charity, as the infused perfection of love, is 
one virtue only. There are not two or more virtues relating to the different ways in which 
humans love. This is because on Aquinas's view, insofar as love is always love of the 
good, the different ways that humans love is united under the aspect of one's final good 
loving God (Ila Ilae q. 23 a. 5) . Humans always love the good formally considered. This 
means that one's love for various things is united under the aspect of one's good formally 
53 Eberhard Schockenhoff, "The Theological Virtue Of Charity (Ila Ilae, qq. 23 
46), trans. Grant Kaplan and Frederick G. Lawrence, in The Ethics Of Aquinas, ed. 
Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 246. 
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considered. What is in fact the ultimate good for humans is God. Charity is the love of 
God. Humans are perfecting their being when they love God insofar as God is in fact 
what is good for humans, which is always the object and cause of love. Consequently, 
humans love everything that they love under the aspect of loving God. We love our 
neighbors for God's sake-we desire the good for our neighbors, which is that they "may 
be in God" (Ila Ilae q. 25 a. 1). We love ourselves insofar as we are able to share in the 
happiness of God which is our final end (Ila Ilae q. 25, a. 4). So, charity orders all the 
virtues to love of God. 
Grace infuses charity in the agent. Likewise, the New Law is "chiefly the grace 
itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe in Christ" (Ia Ilae q. 106 a 
1 ). When agents are friends of God, that is, when they have been infused with the virtue 
of charity by grace, they are under the New Law, which, as we've said, means they do 
what turns out to be in accord with the law, even though they do not do it from the law. In 
other words, when agents are properly ordered by the virtue of charity, the actions that 
the agent does will be actions that are in accord with God's providence, actions that fulfill 
God's ordering. We've already said that Aquinas understands law as God's provision for 
implementing his providential plans in the face of human sin. Law is not the source of 
the moral life. The source of the moral life is love for God. Though the virtue of charity 
will not elicit actions that are in fact contrary to the law, law only binds the person who 
lacks virtue. Obligation, then, will not be felt as a motivator of action by the person of 
perfect virtue. That all humans do in fact experience obligation is simply because, as 
Aquinas argues, perfect human happiness cannot be attained in this life. This is not to 
say that perfect human happiness is something altogether different from the imperfect 
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happiness that is possible in this life. Rather, it is the completion of imperfect happiness 
insofar as it is the unbroken union with God, rather than the fleeting glimpses of this life. 
The occasion for obligation, then can only be when one fails to act from virtue. 
Obligation arises where there is a lack of friendship with God and it would have us do 
those actions which we would do if we loved God as we should. The answer to the 
question, "why does the command 'do not murder' present itself to me as a moral 
obligation," is, "because I do not love God." If I loved God out of the virtue of charity, I 
would not murder; but not because 'do not murder' is commanded of me. I would not 
murder because I would be properly ordered by charity to God, and would act from 
virtue. Obligation would have me do the things that I would desire to do if I loved God. 
Far from the essence of morality, then, obligation is nothing but a deficiency of virtue. 
5. Conclusion 
I began this thesis by noting that modem ethical theory understands obligation to 
be the essence of morality because morality is taken to be constituted by categorical 
imperatives. Foot challenges the thesis that morality is a system of categorical 
imperatives and concludes, as a result, that the feeling of necessity and universality of 
morality is nothing more than a consequence of the way morality is taught and enforced. 
While agreeing with Foot that modem notions of morality as a system of categorical 
imperatives and of obligation as the essence of morality are misguided, I have argued by 
using Aquinas and some of his interpreters that moral imperatives present themselves to 
us as necessary and universal rather because of the natural fact that humans always, in 
virtue of acting intentionally, pursue the good. The necessity, then, comes neither from 
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the imperatives themselves, nor from the stringency with which those imperatives are 
enforced, but from the fact that humans necessarily, because of their nature, pursue the 
good. Likewise, the universality comes neither from the nature of the imperatives nor 
from the consistency with which they are enforced, but from the fact that all humans, in 
virtue of engaging in properly human acts, pursue the good and are thus not beyond the 
reach of moral imperatives. 
Furthermore, that morality presents itself to us in the form of obligations in the 
first place is neither a result of the fact that morality is constituted by categorical 
imperatives, nor, as Foot claims, merely a function of the way morality is taught and 
enforced. Rather, morality presents itself to us in the form of obligations because of a 
failure on our part to act from the theological virtue of charity. Were we perfected in the 
virtue of charity no act would present itself as obligatory since we would act from love of 
God, not from coercion of the law. Foot, then, while correct to deny that obligation is the 
essence of morality, fails to recognize the centrality of charity in the moral life, and thus 
the proper place and characterization of obligation. 
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